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The last 150 years have been a period of unusual demographic change.  Baby 
booms occurred in the aftermath of wars in some countries.  In others, baby booms 
occurred as a result of falling infant mortality rates and subsequent reductions in fertility. 
Baby boom generations produce an echo, in the form of a large cohort of children a 
generation later, creating long-term demographic disequilibria.  These destabilized age 
structures, together with improvements in health and longevity among the elderly, are 
producing, for the first time in history, populations with large and growing rates of old 
age dependency. 
We argue that transitions from high mortality and fertility to low mortality and 
fertility can be beneficial to economies as the large baby boom cohorts enter the 
workforce and save for retirement, while rising longevity has perhaps increased both the 
incentive to invest in education and to save for retirement.  We present estimates of a 
model of economic growth that highlights the positive effects of demographic change 
during 1960-95.  We also show how Ireland benefited from lower fertility in the form of 
higher labor supply per capita and how Taiwan benefited through increased savings rates. 
We emphasize, however, that the realization of the potential benefits associated with the 
demographic transition appears to be dependent on institutions and policies, requiring the 
productive employment of the potential workers and savings the transition generates. 
Population aging is a new phenomenon, which makes it difficult to draw insights 
from previous experience.  Simple projections based on changes in age structure point to 
the possibility of downward pressure on income per capita in developed countries.  We 
doubt, however, that this will be as large a problem as sometimes claimed.  First, income 
per capita is not a welfare measure, and looking at consumption, health, and longevity 
over the life cycle (a cohort measure of welfare rather than a period measure of output) 
gives a rather more optimistic picture. 
Second, the simple economic projections tend to be based on an “accounting” 
approach that assumes that age-specific behavior remains unchanged, and then sums over 
the population age structure.  But this approach ignores the potentially powerful effects of 
behavior change.  Real savings are required to finance the retirement of the aging 
population.  The aging of the baby boom cohort potentially promotes labor shortages, 
creating upward pressure on wages and downward pressure on the real incomes of 
retirees.  We expect a behavioral response to these pressures in developed economies in 
the form of a longer working life, longer working hours, increased labor force 
 
1  Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium on Global Demographic 
Change: Economic Impacts and Policy Challenges.  Jackson Hole, Wyoming August 26-28, 2004.  The 
authors would like to thank their discussant Joel Mokyr and other Symposium participants for comments.  
Fifi Godale also provided a useful comment.  Financial support for this paper was provided by the 






participation and utilization rates, and immigration of workers from developing countries. 
The argument for a longer working life is supported by the improved health, as well as 
increased longevity, of the elderly.  Countries that possess financial institutions that best 
channel savings into productive investments, and labor market institutions and policies 
that best facilitate a supply response to labor shortages and high wages, will be in a 
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Until the early 18
th century, global population size was relatively static and the lives of 
the vast majority of people were “nasty, brutish, and short.”
1  Since then, the size and 
structure of the global population have undergone extraordinary change.  Over three 
decades have been added to life expectancy, with a further gain of close to two more 
decades projected for this century.  World population has increased by an order of 
magnitude to over 6 billion, and is projected to reach 9 billion by mid-century.  Past and 
projected additions to world population have been, and will increasingly be, distributed 
unevenly across the world.  The disparities reflect the existence of considerable 
heterogeneity in birth, death, and migration processes, both over time and across national 
populations, races, and ethnic groups.  Coupled with the projected increase in global 
population is a complicated set of age structure dynamics, including a near quadrupling 
of the population aged 60 and over by the year 2050. 
  Demographic realities are substantially determined by economic and social 
circumstances and institutions.  But they also influence those circumstances and 
institutions through a variety of potential channels.  The microeconomic links between 
various demographic indicators and economic outcomes have been extensively studied. 
By contrast, the links that run from demographics to economics and that operate at the 
level of national economies are far less certain.  Some of these links arise partly as 
accounting identities, such as the effect of population size on GDP, or the effects of 
population age structure on aggregate labor supply and savings.  Other links, such as the 
effect of fertility decline on female labor supply, and the effect of longevity on the 
incentives to save and to retire, are fundamentally behavioral in nature.  
  The objective of this paper is to explore the implications of demographic change 
for macroeconomic performance.  Section II reviews major features of the global  
demographic scene and its evolution.  Section III sets out a simple model of economic 
growth that allows for possible demographic effects.  The parameters of this model are 
 
1 This phrase comes from Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), the English moral and political philosopher, 
writing about life in an unregulated state of nature in Leviathan (1660).  
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estimated using cross-country panel data during 1960-95.  Insofar as the estimates 
suggest plausible and powerful links that run from population age structure and health to 
economic growth, we turn in Section IV to examining the labor supply, savings, and 
education channels through which these demographic factors may affect economic 
growth, either because of accounting or behavior.  Special attention is paid to population 
health and age structure as missing factors in a unified explanation of such disparate 
phenomena as East Asia’s “economic miracle” and sub-Saharan Africa’s economic 
debacle.  We also examine the contribution of demographic change to Ireland’s 
emergence as the “Celtic Tiger.”  Finally, Section V looks to the future and stresses the 
role that market and non-market institutions can play, at both the national and global 
levels, in allowing economies to cushion adverse macroeconomic impacts of 
demographic changes and to magnify and capture the beneficial impacts.        
 
II. GLOBAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 
 
Improvements in health and the related rise in life expectancy are among the most 
remarkable demographic changes of the past century.  For the world as a whole, life 
expectancy more than doubled from around 30 years in 1900 to 65 years by 2000 (and is 
projected to rise to 81 by the end of this century; Lee 2003).  Most of the historical rise 
reflects declines in infant and child mortality due to public health interventions related to 
water and sanitation, and to medical interventions such as vaccine coverage and the use 
of antibiotics.  By contrast, the life expectancy gains observed over the past few decades 
(especially in high-income countries) and projected into the future are predominantly 
associated with reductions in age-specific death rates at the middle and older ages.  These 
reductions are typically associated with improvements in medical technology, life-style 
changes, and income growth.   
Figure 1 shows the historical demographic transition for Sweden, one of the few 
countries for which we have long time-series’ of fairly good demographic data.   
Concentrating first on the death rate, we see that before 1800 death rates in Sweden were 
consistently high, with periodic spikes caused by epidemics of disease and famines.  Life 
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expectancy in this period was between 20 and 30.  However, starting around 1820 we see 
a long-term decline in death rates, and while some spikes in death rates after 1820 remain 
(the last spike being the 1918-19 influenza epidemic), they are considerably attenuated. 
The beginning of the historical decline in mortality in Europe after 1820 preceded the 
germ theory of disease, and widespread provision of clean water and sanitation systems 
in cities in the second half of the 19
th century, and may be due to rising living standards.  
The slight upturn in the crude death rate after 1960 is due to population aging and high 
death rates among the elderly, as independent data show that age-specific mortality rates 
continue to decline and life expectancy continues to rise. 
 

































Birth Rate Death Rate
This pattern of declining death rates is common throughout Europe.
2  I n  a  
worldwide perspective, Bloom and Canning (2001) show that mortality rates were high 
across the world in the 19
th century, with little difference between poor and rich 
countries.  In the first half of the 20
th century a wide differential opened up, with rich 
countries enjoying low infant mortality while rates remained very high in developing 
countries.  The second half of the 20
th century saw large improvements in infant 
mortality, even in very poor countries.  While there is undoubtedly a gradient between 
income and health with higher incomes leading to better health and lower mortality 
 
2 One exception is the precipitous fall in life expectancy in Russia in the 1990’s (see Bennett, Bloom, and 
Ivanov, 1998).  
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(Preston, 1975; Pritchett and Summers, 1996), the most important effect has been the 
downward movement of the whole relationship over time, with improvements in health at 
every income level. 
Along with gains in nutrition, relatively inexpensive public health measures 
aimed at disease prevention initially, and medical interventions for the prevention and 
treatment of infectious disease later, were the basis for early improvements in health. 
More recently, improvements in health have relied on the treatment of non-infectious 
diseases, such as cardiovascular disease and cancer, requiring medical interventions that 
are more costly.  
Turning to the birth rate, we see a fairly high level historically in Sweden.  While 
fertility rates within marriage were high, Europe before 1870 was exceptional in the 
world in having late marriage for women, with ages at marriage in the late 20s being 
common.  After 1870 (there is some evidence of an effect from around 1800 in France) 
we see a large decline in fertility rates within marriage throughout Western Europe, with 
Sweden following this pattern.  The European Fertility project (Coale and Watkins, 1986) 
found that this decline was quite widespread, and seems to have been fairly independent 
of economic factors.   
In developing countries, the pattern has been for fertility to remain high for a 
considerable period of time, but when fertility rates start falling they tend to fall at a 
relatively rapid pace.  Fertility remains high initially due to high desired family size.  The 
causes of the fertility decline in low-income countries can be ascribed to falling infant 
mortality rates, and high levels of female education and labor market opportunities that 
reduce desired fertility, together with the provision of family planning services (Schultz, 
1997).   
The historic pattern of the fertility transition we see in Figure 1 has been repeated 
in many countries, with the declines in death occurring first followed at a later stage by 
declines in the birth rate.  But the pace of these declines is occurring more rapidly in 
today’s developing countries than it did historically.  Insofar as the gap between the birth 
rate and the death rate in Figure 1 is the rate of population growth (assuming no net 
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migration), one immediate consequence of the demographic transition, since death rates 
tend to decline prior to the birth rate, is a period of rapid population growth.   
On the strength of an annual growth rate of 1.7%, world population more than 
doubled from 1950 to 2000, increasing from 2.6 to 6 billion.  The growth rate is projected 
by the United Nations Population Division to drop sharply during the next half century 
(to under 0.8 percent) as birth rates decline, but an additional 3 billion people will 
nevertheless be added to the planet.
 3  
However, population growth is not the only result of the demographic transition. 
Changes also occur in the age structure of the population.  The initial fall in mortality 
rates creates a “boom generation,” in which there are more people at the young ages than  
in earlier generations because survival rates – mainly infant and child survival – are 
higher.  After a period of time, fertility rates fall as people realize they do not need as 
many births to reach their desired family size, or as desired fertility abates as a result of 
some combination of educational development, income growth, and the expansion of 
women’s opportunities to work outside the home.  Improved access to family planning 
supplies and services may also be an important factor (Bongaarts, 1994, 1997; though 
Pritchett, 1994 argues otherwise).  At that point, the baby boom stops.  But the age 
structure of the population then shows a “bulge” that is created by the non-synchronous 
falls in mortality and fertility.  The bulge is particularly pronounced if the drops in 
mortality and fertility are large and if the period between mortality and fertility decline is 
short.
4  The bulge works its way through the age structure and, for a period of time, the 
share of the population that is of working age (generally taken to be 15-64) can be 
significantly higher than it was previously and than it will be in the future.  Eventually 
 
3 It has been asserted in recent years that the world no longer faces a “population problem.”  This assertion 
has a variety of sources, including a series of downward revisions of global population projections by the 
United Nations over the past 10 years (from 10 billion to slightly under 9 billion by 2050).  The assertion 
also reflects the toll of AIDS mortality and evidence that fertility decline has proceeded faster than 
previously assumed.  While there is some truth to the view that world population has lost its “explosive” 
character, an increase of 3 billion in this half-century is still exceedingly large by historical standards.  It 
corresponds, for example, to total world population as recently as 1960.  It also corresponds to adding 
nearly three populations the current size of India, or almost five populations the size of sub-Saharan Africa. 
4 The experience of different regions of the developing world in the latter half of the 20
th century shows 
that the time lag between the onset of the fall in mortality rates and the corresponding decline in fertility 
rates can occur within widely different time frames, from 15 years upwards.  
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the bulge will reach the older ages (as reflected in the UN population projections noted 
above). 
In Europe and the United States the demographic transition was relatively slow 
and produced mild age structure effects.  The major reason for the demographic 
imbalances in these countries is the baby boom that followed World War II.  This boom 
has several explanations, including an echo effect of the baby boom that followed the 
high mortality rates of the influenza epidemic of 1918-19 (probably to replace children 
lost during the epidemic, or reflecting childbearing that was postponed during World War 
I), the postponement in childbearing due to the economic hardships and uncertainties of 
the Great Depression, and spousal separation associated with World War II.  The post-
World War II baby boom and its echo (a subsequent baby boom after 25 years, as the  
boomers themselves had children) profoundly destabilized the age structures, for variable 
periods of time, in many developed countries.       
  Figures 2-5 illustrate this process in more detail for Japan.  Figure 2 shows that 
the crude birth rate (i.e. the number of births per 1000 population), following Japan’s 
post-World War II baby boom, fell by more than half between 1950 and 2000.  The bump 
in 1970 reflects the echo effect of Japan’s baby boom, which occurred during 1946 to 
1951.  Figure 2 also shows that the birth rate is projected to remain low, and cross below 
the crude death rate, during the present decade.  The crude death rate is itself projected to 
rise.  This rise, which seems at first sight to be at odds with the projected rise in life 
expectancy (Figure 3), reflects the dominance of the increasingly elderly age distribution 
projected for Japan as the relatively large cohorts born during 1946 to the early 1970s 
reach the older ages.  This baby boom can be seen in Figure 4, which represents a 
succession of cross-sectional population age distributions (e.g. the first slice represents 
the age distribution in 1950, the second slice represents the age distribution in 1960, etc.). 
In the absence of mortality and migration, the population aged a at time t will become the 
population aged a+10 at time t+10.  Thus, the diagonals in Figure 4 represent true birth 
cohorts.
5  In this connection, note that the diagonal ridges observed in Figure 4 represent 
 
5 There is, however, a small exception to note here since, starting in 1990, the age grouping reported by the 
UN changed from 85+ to 85-89, 90-94, 95-99, and 100+.    
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Japan’s baby boom cohorts.  These ridges begin to reach the older ages in 2010, 
corresponding to the rise in the rate of elderly dependency in Japan. 
  Figure 5 offers a two-dimensional view of this secular “age wave” process by 
plotting the ratio of the working-age population to the non-working-age population (i.e. 
the ratio of 15-64 years olds to the sum of those below age 15 and those ages 65 and 
over).  Declining fertility in Japan is associated with a sizable rise in the working age 
share (from 1.5 in 1950 to about 2.3 in the 1990s).  But going forward, population aging 
will dominate and the working age share will recede steadily from its recent peak (falling  
to roughly 1.0 at mid-century, which is slightly below the current level in sub-Saharan 
Africa). 
In fact, population aging in Japan may be more extreme than this.  The United 
Nations’ projections assume that fertility will gradually rise to replacement levels of 2.1 
children per woman, but there is no guarantee that this will happen, and indeed, 
continued low fertility or even further fertility declines seem more likely.  
 
 































Birth Rate Death Rate
 
  10HARVARD INITIATIVE FOR GLOBAL HEALTH 
WORKING PAPER NO. 1 
 
 
















Figure 4   Japan: population by age and year 
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The world as a whole is also in the midst of a period of change in its age structure. 
The world’s population aged 60 and over, which currently represents slightly more than 
half the number of 15-24 year olds (over 1 billion people), is rising sharply and projected 
to surpass 1 billion within two decades (and to overtake the 15-24 age group).  The 
population aged 80 and over is projected to increase at an annual rate of 3.4% from 2000 
to 2050, corresponding to an increase from 1 to 4 percent in the global population share 
of the “oldest old.”  Moreover, the process of population aging is accelerating.  During 
the last 50 years, the number of people aged 60 or over in the world rose by 350 million 
(to 550 million); in the next 50 years, a 1.5 billion increase is projected.  Figure 6 shows, 
for the world as a whole, the overall dependency ratio: the ratio of the young (0-14 years 
old) and the old (65 years old or more) to those of working age (15 to 64 year olds).  
From around 1970 the overall dependency rate has being falling due to falling fertility 
and youth dependency.  However, old age dependency has been rising, and from 2010 
onwards we see a projected upward trend in the overall dependency rate for the world as 
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Cross-country heterogeneity is among the most salient features of the global 
demographic profile.  For example, virtually all of the increase projected in world 
population to 2050 will occur among today’s low- and middle-income countries.  By 
contrast, population aging will be most rapid in Western Europe, the United States, and in 
particular, Japan, where 42% of the population is projected to be aged 60 or over by 
2050, with 16% aged 80+.  Japan has recently become the first country in history with an 
average age of over 40.  Japan is projected to have nearly one million centenarians (1% 
of the population) by 2050. 
Demographic heterogeneity is considerable not just between, but also within, 
country income groups.  For example, fertility rates are well below replacement in 
Europe, whereas they have been hovering at replacement levels in the United States since 
1990.  Net migration to Europe has been relatively slow in the past decade, whereas net 
migration to the United States has given a sizable boost to its population (including the 
echo effect of above-average fertility among migrants and their children).  According to 
current projections, which reflect the implications of recent fertility and net migration 
differences, the population of the United States will overtake that of Europe by 2040. 
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Figure 7 shows the ratio of working age to non-working age population in East 
Asia, South Asia, Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and the United States.  It shows that the 
working age to non-working age population ratio rose fastest in East Asia, a consequence 
of its rapid and pronounced demographic transition.  But it also shows that East Asia, 
which experienced the most rapid declines in fertility, will exhibit the most sizable drop 
in this ratio given its projected age structure dynamics in the decades ahead.  Europe will 
follow a path similar to that of East Asia as a consequence of rapid population aging, 
while the trajectory of the United States will be qualitatively similar but far less dramatic, 
with the ratio being supported by somewhat higher fertility and by immigration.  Fertility 
decline is well under way in South Central Asia, most notably in India and Bangladesh, 
and its working age ratio already shows signs of increase.  Similarly, North Africa and 
the Middle East are now well into the fertility reduction phase of the demographic 
transition.              
At the other end of the demographic spectrum, sub-Saharan Africa continues to 
experience an extremely sluggish demographic transition.  In most countries of sub-
Saharan Africa, children continue to be viewed as a valuable source of labor and 
insurance for old age.  As a result, traditionally high fertility rates and large family sizes 
have persisted in the face of improvements in infant and child mortality, and now the 
ravages of HIV/AIDS are depleting the working age population.
6  As a result, the average 
age of the population has remained low, as has the proportion of working age people.
7 
The projection of a rise in the working age ratio in Figure 7 for sub-Saharan Africa is 






6With respect to mortality, nearly one fourth of all deaths in sub-Saharan Africa are now due to HIV/AIDS, 
a rate that is overwhelmingly in excess of the corresponding rate in all other developing regions (UNAIDS 
2004).  This has a potentially large effect on these economies, given the fact that deaths from AIDS are 
concentrated among prime age workers, and insofar as the rise in orphans and decline in prospective 
longevity, may reduce investments in human capital. 
7 Some African nations —notably those in southern Africa, including Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, 
and Zimbabwe—are beginning to show reductions in fertility. 
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While population aging is occurring in developed countries, it is also likely to 
come about in developing countries over the next 50 years.  Indeed, given the pace of 
advances in health and lower mortality, and declines in fertility (particularly in China, 
due to the one child policy), large-scale population aging is likely in developing countries 
before they reach high levels of income.  The window of opportunity created by the 
potential demographic dividend that occurs when birth rates and youth dependency rates 
fall is temporary, and is replaced by old age dependency as the baby boom cohort ages.  
 
III. EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE ON ECONOMIC 
GROWTH  
 
BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTS 
 
Although it is often argued that rapid population growth has a negative effect on the 
growth rate of income per capita, compelling evidence on this point has been rather 
elusive and counterarguments abound.  Most studies find little cross-country evidence of 
a significant effect, holding constant myriad other influences on the rate of economic 
growth.  Whether this result reflects the true unimportance of population growth, 
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offsetting negative and positive influences of population growth on economic growth, 
inadequate control variables or other model specification errors, poor data, or reverse 
causality, continue to be open questions.  Nonetheless, this body of empirical research 
has tended to support what has come to be known as the population neutralist view: 
population growth neither systematically impedes nor promotes economic growth.  This 
view has been the dominant academic belief in this area since the early 1980s and 
contributed to the marginalization of population and reproductive health as an instrument  
of economic development among key development agencies like the World Bank. (See 
Ahlburg, 2002; Birdsall, Kelley, and Sinding, 2001; Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla, 2002; 
Kelley, 1988, 2001; Kelley and Schmidt, 2001).  
New evidence and thinking has emerged in the past few years that challenges, and 
is beginning to unseat, this longstanding view.  This new evidence relates to the 
importance of population age distribution in the determination of macroeconomic 
performance.  
There are two main ideas here.  The first, as detailed in the preceding section, is 
that population growth and changes in the age structure of the population are both 
consequences of the demographic transition.  The second is that people’s economic needs 
and contributions vary over the life cycle.  For example, young people tend to be net 
consumers, while working age people tend to be net producers and savers, with the 
elderly falling somewhere in between.  This implies that the age structure of a population 
may be very consequential for its economic performance – as measured by income per 
capita.  Large youth and elderly cohorts might slow the pace of economic growth, while 
large working age cohorts might speed it.    
Contrary to the neutralist view, the emerging evidence indicates that population 
does matter to economic growth, with age structure playing a central role.  As the 
dependency ratio falls, opportunities for economic growth tend to rise, creating what is 
now referred to as a “demographic dividend.”  
East Asia’s macroeconomic performance is tracked very closely by its 
demographic transition and resulting changes in age structure.  Estimates indicate that as 
much as one-third of its “economic miracle” can be accounted for as a “demographic 
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dividend (Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Bloom, Canning, and Malaney, 2000; Mason, 
2001). By contrast, the absence of demographic change also accounts for a large portion 
of Africa’s economic debacle (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla, 2002; Bloom and Sachs, 
1998).  In addition, the introduction of demographics has reduced the need for the 
argument that there was something exceptional about East Asia or idiosyncratic to Africa.  
Most models of economic growth have significant region dummies, usually negative for 
sub-Saharan Africa and positive for East Asia, indicating that the poor performance of 
Africa and the exceptionally good growth performance of East Asia cannot be explained 
within the models.  Once age structure dynamics are introduced into an economic growth 
model, these regions are much closer to obeying common principles of economic growth 
(Bloom and Canning, 2001; Bloom, Canning, and Malaney, 2000) and the statistical 
significance of the region dummy variables disappears.    
It is also clear, both theoretically and empirically, that there is nothing automatic 
about the link from demographic change to economic growth (Bloom and Canning, 2001; 
Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla, 2002; Bloom and Canning, 2003a).  Age distribution 
changes merely create potential for economic growth.  Whether or not this potential is 
captured depends on the policy environment, as reflected, for example, by the quality of 
governmental institutions, labor legislation, macroeconomic management, openness to 
trade, and education policy.  This realm is where Latin America seems to have stumbled. 
During 1965 to 1990, its demographics resembled those of East Asia, but its economic 
performance lagged well behind.  Episodes of high inflation, political instability, 
adversarial labor relations, and an inward orientation with respect to trade through much 
of the period appear to have prevented many Latin American countries from exploiting 






8 As discussed below, Ireland is, like much of East Asia, an example of a country whose policy 
environment enabled it to take advantage of its demographic dividend.  
  17HARVARD INITIATIVE FOR GLOBAL HEALTH 








Income per capita is the major focus of most empirical models of economic growth.  It is 
a convenient summary of the standard of living and a useful measure of the level of 
economic development.  However, in theoretical terms, models of income growth usually 
rely on a production function that links factor inputs and total factor productivity to 
output.  Dividing the production function through by labor gives us a relationship in 
which output per worker is due to the level of inputs per worker and the productivity with 
which inputs are used.  Letting  be the initial level of income per worker, we can write 
the growth rate of income per worker   as       
0 z
z g
0 (* ) z gz z λ = −  
where z* is the steady state level of income per worker and λ  is the speed of 
convergence.  The steady state level of income per worker depends on any factors (such 
as capital stock and education levels per worker, and total factor productivity levels) that 
may affect labor productivity.  We write the vector of variables that can affect steady 
state labor productivity as X, which gives us  * zX β =  and so 
0 () z gX z λ β = −  
This type of growth model is discussed extensively in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995).  
We now wish to develop a theory of the growth of income per capita.  We start 
with an accounting identity that links income per capita (Y/N) to income per member of 
the working age population (Y/WA) 
 
YY L W A
NL W A N
=  
In this identity WA represents the population of working age, L is the labor force, and N 
the total population.  The identity merely states that the level of income per capita equals 
the level of income per worker, times the participation rate, times the ratio of working 
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age to total population.  If we assume that the participation rate is constant,
9 in growth 
rate terms this implies that   
  // YN YW A W AN ggg = +  
and making the following substitutions,  









we can derive (remembering that p, the participation rate, is assumed constant) 
yz ggg = +  
Hence we have (since )   00 yzp w =+ + 0
g 00 () yw gX p w y λ β = ++ − +  
This final equation is similar in form to the standard regressions run in economic growth 
analyses.  It relates growth in income per capita to a range of variables, X, and the initial 
level of income per capita, .  We assume that the participation rate p is captured in the 
constant term of the regression.  However, several other terms appear. The ratio of 
workers to total population appears both as a level term and as a growth term. Due to the 
identity used to derive this regression, the coefficients on these terms are fixed (equal 
to
0 y
λ , or minus the coefficient on initial income per capita for the level term and equal to 




We construct a panel of countries observed every five years from 1960 to 1995.  Data on 
GDP per capita are obtained from the Penn World Tables version 6.0 (this data set is an 
update of Heston and Summers (1991).  Data on the working age (those 15 to 64 years 
old) and total population come from the United Nations (1998).  
  In addition to these variables, we include in our regressions a number of 
indicators that potentially explain labor productivity differences across countries (the 
variables in our vector X in the theory section above).  Schooling is measured by the 
                                                 
9 Bloom and Canning (2003b) attempt to use the participation rate in such a regression but are rather 
unsuccessful, perhaps due to problems in measuring labor force participation across countries.  
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average total years of schooling of the population aged 15 years and older from Barro and 
Lee (2000).  Life expectancy data are from the United Nations (1998).  We use these as a 
proxy for the health of the workforce, even though they measure mortality rates rather 
than morbidity.  Higher life expectancy is generally associated with better health status 
and lower morbidity (Murray and Chen, 1992; Murray and Lopez, 1997).  Schooling and 
health can be thought of as indicators of the quality of labor. 
  We also include a range of geographic and institutional variables that may affect 
factor productivity.  Our governance variable is based on the index created by Knack and 
Keefer (1995), which gives an average indicator of the quality of public institutions.  The 
index is based on data for 1982 and does not vary within a country over the period we 
analyze.  Data on the percentage of land area in the tropics and a dummy for being 
landlocked come from Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999).  We include some country-
specific variables that may affect the long-run level of total factor productivity.  We also 
use a measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization from Easterly and Levine (1997), and 
the Sachs and Warner (1995) measure of openness to trade (which also depends on a 




We explain growth in per capita output in the five-year period by a fairly standard set of 
explanatory variables but adding our demographic variables, for a panel of countries over 
the period 1965-1995.  The results are reported in Table 1.  In column 1 we report the 
results of estimating the relationship by ordinary least squares.  We find that open 
economies, with good institutions and fairly homogeneous populations (i.e. low ethno-
linguistic fractionalization), have higher rates of economic growth.  In this regression, 
being landlocked is not statistically significant; neither is being located in the tropics.  
The average years of schooling of the workforce does not appear to be significant either, 
though better health in the form of higher life expectancy does have a significant positive 
effect on growth.  The coefficient on the initial level of income per capita is negative, 
indicating catch-up to a steady state defined by the other variables as set out in the theory 
section.   
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Table 1   Estimates of the determinants of the growth rate of income per capita  
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Growth of working age 








Growth of working age 
times openness 
 
   2.524** 
(2.08) 
R squared  0.321  0.318  0.313 
Based on 507 observations, from five-year panel of countries, over the period 1965-1995.  Time 
dummies included but not reported.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  
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We find that the coefficient on the log of the working age over the total 
population has a positive and significant sign as expected.  In terms of growth rates, the 
growth of the ratio of working age to total population has a positive sign and is very close 
to the expected value of one. 
  Most of the explanatory variables in this specification are measured at the start of 
each five-year period and are therefore prior to the economic growth being explained.  
However, the growth in the ratio of working age to total population is contemporaneous 
with the economic growth being explained and may therefore be endogenously 
determined.  It seems quite reasonable to expect periods of strong economic growth to 
induce a higher ratio of working age to total population, partly through migration effects 
but also through an effect on fertility and therefore the youth dependency rate.  To try to 
control for this potential endogeneity we repeat the analysis reported in column 1 but 
instrument the growth rate of working age to total population with its lagged value (from 
the previous five-year period).  The results, shown in column 2, do not change much 
except that now the negative effect on growth of being located in the tropics appears to be 
statistically significant. 
  The estimated coefficients of the demographic variables in Table 1 are, at first 
sight, difficult to interpret.  Since their inclusion comes from an identity (see the theory 
section above), we could exclude them from the estimation by imposing the parameter 
restrictions directly from the identity.  However, the theoretical accounting model 
assumes that behavior remains unchanged while the working age ratio changes, and that 
all potential workers are productively employed.  Increases in the ratio of working age to 
total population increase the potential labor force.  Provided the measures of human 
capital (such as health and education) in our model capture any changes in the quality of 
the labor force during this inflow of workers, and the participation rate of the working 
age group remains the same, the coefficients from the identity are correct.  However, it 
seems likely that large expansions of the labor force will lead to changes in average 
quality in ways we do not measure, and in addition there may be a participation rate 
effect.  In particular we might expect that as youth and old age dependency rates decline 
(and the working age to non-working age ratio rises), the need for care of dependents at 
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home will fall allowing labor force participation to rise.  We estimate, rather than impose, 
the coefficients on our demographic variables allowing these labor quality and 
participation rate effects to potentially be included in our estimates. 
         The effect of increases in the working age population on labor supply is to give a 
supply-side boost to potential output.  However, the availability of extra workers will 
have little effect if they are not employed.  In column 3 of Table 1 we report estimates of 
the parameters of a regression model that is specified to include an interaction effect 
between the ratio of working age to total population and the degree of openness of the 
economy.  This allows us to test whether the effect of increasing the working age ratio 
depends on the flexibility of the economy as measured by its openness.   
  We find a large positive coefficient on this interaction term, indicating that a 
completely open economy (openness equal to one in our measure) will enjoy nearly twice 
the growth impact of demographic change as an average country.  In addition, the results 
in column 3 indicate that a country with a closed economy (openness equal to zero) will 
have no gain from demographic change (the coefficient on the growth in the working age 
ratio in column 3 is negative but not statistically different from zero).  This indicates that 
the impact of demographic change may be to increase labor supply, but how well this 
extra supply of workers is put to productive employment depends on the economic 
system and policies being used. 
 
IV. EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE ON LABOR SUPPLY, 
SAVINGS, AND EDUCATION  
 
Table 1 suggests two demographic effects on macroeconomic performance.  The first is 
the effect of age structure, particularly the ratio of the working age to the total population. 
The second is the effect of longevity, as measured by life expectancy.  We find 
demographic variables to have positive and large effects on economic growth.  In this 
section we discuss the mechanisms through which these demographic factors appear to 
operate. 
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  The two mechanisms on which we focus initially relate to the effects of 
demography on labor supply per capita and on savings.  Given well-established life-cycle 
variations in behavior, it is reasonable to suppose that changes in age structure will have 
effects on aggregate outcomes.  For example, since labor supply tends to follow an 
inverted U-shaped pattern with respect to age, changes in the age composition of the 
population are likely to have effects on aggregate labor supply.  Savings rates also vary 
with age, with the highest rates occurring for 40 to 70 year olds, implying that changes in 
the age structure will affect aggregate savings rates. 
  However, in addition to these “accounting” effects (assuming age-specific 
behavior remains unchanged, we can simply calculate the consequences of age structure 
change mechanically) there are also behavioral effects.  Generational crowding (i.e. being 
born into a large cohort) may have effects on relative wages and individual labor supply 
(Easterlin, 1980; Bloom, Freeman, and Korenman, 1987; Korenman and Neumark, 
2000).  In addition, the decision to reduce fertility and youth dependency rates may be 
linked to labor market participation, particularly among women.   
  The effect of life expectancy that we find can be due to a number of mechanisms. 
One is that higher life expectancy goes hand in hand with better health, and better health 
may improve worker productivity (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla, 2004).  However, there 
may also be a demographic effect as a longer prospective life span can change life-cycle 
behavior, leading to a longer working life or higher savings for retirement (Bloom, 
Canning, and Graham, 2003; Bloom, Canning, and Moore, 2004).     
  We examine these issues more closely by focusing on two particular cases.  The 
first case relates to the role of demographic factors in the emergence of the “Celtic 
Tiger”: Ireland’s remarkable economic boom during the 1990’s.  In particular, we focus 
on the effect of age structure changes in Ireland on its labor market and macroeconomic 
performance.  The second case involves the contribution of demographic factors to the 
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LABOR SUPPLY AND THE CELTIC TIGER  
 
Ireland has been slow to complete the demographic transition.  The death rate in Ireland, 
which drifted down only slightly during the period 1950-2000, has been relatively low by 
international standards (in the neighborhood of 10 per thousand) and comparable to the 
rest of Europe.  By contrast, the birth rate was much higher through the early 1980s (over 
20 per thousand).  Indeed, Ireland has long been seen as a demographic outlier within 
Europe, since its fertility rate was still moderately high when those in other European 
countries had fallen to near, or below, replacement level.  Figure 8 shows a comparison 
of the total fertility rate in Ireland and the United Kingdom; comparisons with other 
European countries would look similar.  The difference between a high birth rate and a 
low death rate would have led to rapid population growth were it not for Ireland’s 
historically high rate of out-migration.  
 

























One reason for Ireland’s high fertility rate was undoubtedly the legal ban on the 
use of contraception.  From the founding of the Irish State in 1922 until 1979, Ireland 
placed severe restrictions on access to contraception, importation of contraceptives, and 
the circulation of literature about contraception.  Irish women and some medical 
institutions resisted these restrictions and by the late 1960s women were increasingly 
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obtaining oral contraceptives under the legally acceptable guise of regulating their 
menstrual cycles.  The Irish women’s movement took up this issue and in 1973 the Irish 
Supreme Court ended the ban on contraception by legalizing the importation of 
contraceptives for personal use; this change was not, however, formally legally 
implemented until 1979 (see Murphy-Lawless and McCarthy, 1999).  In that year, the 
sale of contraceptives for use in family planning was made legal upon presentation of a 
doctor’s prescription.  From 1985 on contraceptives could be sold to all those aged 18 
and over without a prescription.  Legalization of contraception was not a sudden or 
unexpected shock.  It arose out of women’s struggles for reproductive freedom and from 
Ireland’s gradual incorporation into a broader cultural world in which contraception was 
widely available and sexual mores were changing.  Nevertheless, legalization was 
important, as it codified societal norms and, as suggested by the data, seems to have been 
tightly connected to a rapid fall in fertility. 
In the aftermath of societal and legal changes regarding contraception, the decline 
in fertility rates in Ireland accelerated after 1979 and the crude birth rate fell sharply 
during the 1980’s, from 21.0 per thousand to 14.2 per thousand.  To some extent Ireland 
represents a “natural experiment” in which the legalization of contraception catalyzed a 
large demographic change, independent of economic activity rates.
10    
Ireland’s rapidly falling birth rate led to falling youth dependency and a higher 
share of working age people.  Figure 9 shows the ratio of the working age (15-64) to the 
non-working age (<15 or >64) population in Ireland from 1950 to 2000 (and projected to 
2050 using UN population projections).  Comparative data for the United Kingdom are 
also shown.  It is clear from this figure that the dependency burden (i.e. the reciprocal of 
the indicator in Figure 9) in Ireland mirrored that in East Asia through the mid-1970s (see 
Figure 7).  At that point, East Asia’s fertility transition, which had begun in the mid-
1960s, was well underway and its dependency burden was falling sharply.  By contrast, 
Ireland’s dependency burden shows signs of sharp decline by the latter portion of the 
 
10 As pointed out to us by Yale biologist Robert Wyman, the legalization of abortion in Japan in 1951 
appears to account for the end of its relatively short baby boom, representing another “natural experiment” 
of sorts.     
  26HARVARD INITIATIVE FOR GLOBAL HEALTH 
WORKING PAPER NO. 1 
 
 
1980s, as a consequence of a declining birth rate during the 1980s.  By the mid-1990s the 
dependency burden in Ireland had dropped to a level below that in the United Kingdom.       
 



























From 1960 to 1990, the growth rate of income per capita in Ireland was 
approximately 3.5 percent per annum.  In the 1990s, the growth rate jumped to 5.8 
percent, which is well in excess of any other European economy, thereby giving rise to 
the notion of the “Celtic Tiger.”  This boost in the growth rate coincides closely with the 
falling dependency rate in Ireland.  Thus, the raw data are consistent with the view that 
demographic change contributed to Ireland’s economic surge in the 1990s.  Bloom and 
Canning (2003b) examine this argument more closely and argue that the economic boom 
that occurred in Ireland in the 1990s is well predicted by estimates of a model similar to 
that shown in Table 1.  As part of their analysis, they also show that the growth in the 
working age to total population ratio was matched by an increase in labor supply per 
capita.  
Economic growth in Ireland was also fueled by two additional demography-based 
factors that increased labor supply per capita.  While male labor force participation rates 
remained fairly static, the period 1980–2000 saw a substantial increase in female labor 
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force participation rates, particularly in the 25-40 year old age group (see Figure 10). 
While one would expect rapid economic growth to encourage female labor participation, 
it seems likely that at least some of the increase was due to the availability of 
contraception and women’s increased freedom to choose between working and rearing 
children.  In addition, Ireland has historically had high levels of outward migration of 
young adults (around 1 percent of the population per year) due to the inability of its 
economy to absorb the large inflows of young workers created by its high fertility rate. 
The loss of these young workers of course exacerbated the problem of the high youth 
dependency rate.  The decline in youth cohort sizes and rapid economic growth of the 
1990s led to a reversal of this flow, resulting in net in-migration of workers, made up 
partly of return migrants but also for the first time of substantial numbers of foreign 
migrants.  






















It is important to note that Ireland, like the “miracle” economies of East Asia, had 
in place economic and social policies that favored its taking advantage of the 
demographic shifts it experienced.  Two key policies appear to have been at work in 
Ireland.  First, in the late 1950s, there was recognition that the “closed economy” model 
of development had failed in Ireland.  This led to new policies with an emphasis on 
encouraging direct foreign investment in Ireland and promoting exports.  Second, from 
the mid-1960s, free secondary education was introduced, leading to a large increase in 
school enrollments and subsequent expansions in higher education.  The resultant high 
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levels of education, combined with export-oriented economic policies, seem to be 
powerful factors in ensuring that the benefits of the demographic transition are realized.
11  
 
THE SAVINGS BOOM IN TAIWAN 
 
Central to our understanding of the East Asian “miracle” has been Alwyn Young’s work 
(Young, 1994, 1995) showing that rapid economic growth in the region was mainly due 
to increases in factor inputs − notably labor, capital, and education − and not to 
improvements in total factor productivity.  In order to understand the rise in income 
levels in East Asia, we must therefore understand the driving forces behind the growth in 
these inputs. 
  All of the Asian “Tiger” economies enjoyed a surge in savings and investment 
during their period of rapid economic growth.  We focus here on Taiwan, for which there 
are fairly good data on household savings.  The private savings rate in Taiwan rose from 
around 5% in the 1950s to well over 20% in the 1980s and 1990s.  Savings rates vary by 
age, being highest in Taiwan for households with heads in the 50-60 year old range.  We 
would therefore expect changing age structure to be a possible explanation of this 
increase in aggregate saving.  Studies that examine the link between demographic 
structure and national savings rates do find a strong connection (Fry and Mason, 1982; 
Higgins, 1998; Higgins and Williamson, 1997; Kelley and Schmidt, 1996; Leff, 1969; 
Mason, 1987, 1988) and suggest that a large part of the savings boom in East Asia can be 
explained by the age structure in the population.  
  However, Deaton and Paxson (2000) show that based on household savings data 
for Taiwan, changes in age structure account for only a modest increase in the overall 
savings rate, perhaps 4 percentage points.  They show that the rise in the aggregate 
savings rate has not been mainly due to changes in the age composition of the population 
but, rather, to a secular rise in the savings rates of all age groups.   
 
11 Although we use “openness” in Table 1 as a factor that may magnify the impact of the demographic 
dividend, we interpret this variable as a proxy for liberal economic policies in general, not as a specific 
endorsement of export orientation.   
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  The question then arises as to why savings rates rose at each age.  One possible 
explanation, proposed by Lee, Mason, and Miller (2000) is that increased savings rates 
are due to rising life expectancy and an increasing need to fund retirement income.  Tsai, 
Chu, and Chung (2000) show that the timing of the rise in household savings rates 
matches the increases in life expectancy of the population. 
  With a fixed retirement age we would expect such a savings effect.  However, 
Deaton and Paxson (2000) argue that in a flexible economy, without mandatory 
retirement, the main effect of a rise in longevity will be on the span of the working life, 
with no obvious prediction for the rate of saving.  Bloom, Canning, and Moore (2004) 
formalize this argument to show that under reasonable assumptions the optimal response 
to an improvement in health and a rise in life expectancy is to increase the length of 
working life, though less than proportionately, with no need to raise saving rates at all 
(due to the gains from enjoying compound interest over a longer life span).   
  While in theory a longer life span should be associated with a longer working life, 
in practice this may not be the case.  Bloom, Canning, and Graham (2003) find that, even 
allowing for age structure effects, longer life expectancy is strongly associated with 
higher national savings rates across countries, which suggests that there is a savings 
effect.
12  This savings effect could of course be due to mandatory retirement systems, 
which prevent workers from lengthening their working lives.  Even in the absence of 
mandatory retirement, Gruber and Wise (1998) argue that many national social security 
systems produce strong financial incentives to retire at particular ages and that workers 
respond to these incentives.  For example, the social security system in Taiwan takes 
5.85% of earnings (jointly from employers and workers), pays a lump sum at retirement 
of at most 50 months salary, and takes contributions, but provides no additional benefits, 
for workers after 35 years of work who are over 65 years old.    
  While the optimal response with perfect markets may be for workers to have a 
longer working life as their health improves and they have longer life expectancies, 
mandatory or conventional retirement ages, coupled with the strong financial incentives 
 
12 The earlier studies of national savings referenced above omit the life expectancy effect, suggesting that 
their age structure effects may be biased since longer life expectancy is highly correlated with an older 
population.   
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to retire that are inherent in many social security systems, seem to result in early 




Demography can affect educational investments through several mechanisms.  Perhaps 
the most important is the quantity–quality tradeoff whereby fertility choices and human 
capital investment decisions are jointly made.  This framework points to lower fertility 
being both a cause and a consequence of increased educational investments, with both 
fertility and schooling determined as well by a common set of factors that affect families’ 
incentives.   
Notwithstanding families’ desired fertility, actual fertility in the absence of 
contraception may be much higher.  The provision of family planning services to 
populations in which desired fertility is low can both lower fertility outcomes and 
increase schooling levels.  This effect may be particularly pronounced for girls’ schooling 
because with high fertility girls are frequently kept out of school to help care for their 
younger siblings.  Foster and Roy (1997) show how a randomized trial providing family 
planning services in Bangladesh affected both fertility outcomes and children’s schooling 
levels. 
The quantity-quality tradeoff can also appear to some extent at the national level 
if schooling is publicly funded.  Smaller youth cohorts can increase the availability of 
educational funding per child and can lead to an expansion of public education (Kelley, 
1996). 
One reason for an increased incentive to invest in education may be the rise in life 
expectancy.  A longer life increases the time over which education investments can be 
recouped.  Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000) argue that the effect of improved 
health and longevity on educational investments has played a large role in economic 
growth over the last 150 years.  This incentive effect, however, is clearly linked to the 
prospective working life rather than total lifespan, suggesting that education levels may 
be linked to planned retirement ages and social security incentives.  
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V. DISCUSSION  
 
For most of the 20
th century the dominant issue in population was the explosion in 
population numbers caused by the lowering of mortality rates coupled with continuing 
high fertility rates.  The predicted negative consequences of high population densities, 
and a high population growth rate, seem not to have been borne out.  Many of the 
predictions made about the immiserizing effects of population growth seem in retrospect 
to have been unduly alarmist. 
Following the 1986 National Academy of Sciences’ report on population growth, 
the revisionist position came to dominate economists’ thinking on population (Kelley, 
2000).  While rapid population growth posed problems, the report argued that market 
mechanisms and non-market institutions were usually sufficiently flexible to ameliorate 
those problems.  In particular, projections of the effects of population growth based on 
unchanged behavior elsewhere in the economy might give a very bleak picture but in 
general would be very misleading.  Changing incentives through price changes, and 
changing non-market institutional arrangements to promote new behaviors, could have 
large effects and produce responses that would alleviate the problems associated with 
population growth. 
The population debate focused on population numbers and missed to a large 
extent the issue of age structure changes.  Population growth caused by rising fertility and 
population growth caused by falling mortality, are likely to have quite different economic 
consequences because they have different age structure effects.  We have examined some 
of these consequences above.  However, it is important to remember the lessons of the 
earlier debate.  Analysis based on “accounting effects,” in particular on the assumption 
that age-specific behavior remains unchanged as the age structure evolves, may be 
misleading.  When this type of analysis predicts large reductions welfare we should be 
particularly suspicious since these are exactly the conditions that will produce incentives 
for behavioral change. 
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  The historical experience with which we are familiar is of reductions in infant and 
child mortality that produce a “baby boom” and that lead to a large working age cohort. 
Subsequent reductions in fertility reduce the dependency ratio.  This change in the age 
structure appears to produce a demographic dividend that is overwhelmingly positive in 
terms of potential economic outcomes.  Labor supply per capita rises when the large baby 
boom cohort enters the working ages and with the increase in female labor force 
participation that is typically associated with fertility decline.  The large working age 
cohort saves for retirement, perhaps at a higher rate than before due to its longer life 
expectancy, producing potential resources for investment.  The longer span and reduced 
mortality rate may also encourage investments in education.  
  The potential of this “demographic dividend” is not always realized; economic 
growth is not an automatic outcome of changes in the population age structure.  A large 
working age population requires a matching demand for labor if the demographic 
dividend is to be enjoyed.  Without appropriate policies the extra labor supply can result 
in unemployment or underemployment, with political instability, elevated rates of crime, 
and the deterioration of social capital a possible further consequence.  
  In our empirical modeling the benefits of the demographic dividend depend on 
good policies.  We use openness of the economy as a proxy for good policies, but 
emphasize it is good policies in general that appear to be beneficial, not just openness to 
trade.  We get similar results if we replace openness with a measure of the quality of 
governmental institutions.  Macroeconomic data are not sufficiently rich to distinguish 
exactly which policies matter most during the transition.     
  Intuitively, the key determinants of whether a country will capitalize on its 
demographic opportunity are how flexible the economy is and its ability to absorb a 
rapidly increasing labor force.  A comparison between Latin America and East Asia is 
instructive here.  Latin America has a demographic history that is similar to that of East 
Asia (although its fertility reduction was less rapid), but the latter experienced rapid 
economic growth, while Latin America stagnated for long periods of time.  
Demographic opportunity alone has been insufficient for Latin America.  We put 
forward three possible hypotheses to account for this.  First, East Asia has found ways to 
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engage in international trade that have helped to keep its large cohorts of workers 
productively employed.  The enabling changes involved a phased, careful, and partial 
opening of economies to international markets, with governments striving to ensure that 
integration would have coherent and quickly visible effects on the local economy and 
people.  In Latin America, too, governments have tried to integrate with the world 
economy, but they have often done so inconsistently and many countries have suffered 
long periods of poor macroeconomic management.  The results, in terms of economic 
growth and poverty reduction, have been disappointing.  Meanwhile, internal markets 
have not been sufficiently dynamic to provide employment to the large working age 
cohort.  
  Second, in comparison with Latin America, East Asia has had, in general, less 
restrictive labor laws.  Laws providing protection to workers – e.g. minimum wages, the 
right to organize, and restrictions on firing – have been very important in many countries 
in steering clear of some of the worst abuses of workers.  At the same time, less 
restrictive labor regimes in East Asia – although perhaps initially harmful to workers – 
may have assisted the absorption of the baby boom cohort of workers.  
    Finally, the financial markets of East Asia may have done a better job of 
mobilizing the potential saving of the baby boom generation towards productive 
investments.  In Latin America, weaker private sector financial institutions, large public 
sector deficits, and the recurrent risk of loss of savings through hyperinflation may all 
have contributed to a wasted economic opportunity.    
  Well-chosen and effectively implemented policies in these areas – engagement 
with the global economy, labor practices, and capital markets (and education
13) – are all 
potential complements to the demographic dividend.  
Many developing regions, particularly South Asia and North Africa, and in the 
more distant future sub-Saharan Africa, can look forward to this demographic dividend. 
 
13 Many countries in East Asia have successfully worked to educate the majority of young people and to do 
so in a fashion that has prepared them for an economy in which workers need to be able to learn new tasks. 
In an era when production methods change quickly in response to international demands and trends, better-
educated workers are more able to adapt to new circumstances and contribute to the success of a wide 
range of industries and firms.  The focus in numerous Asian countries on building a cadre of young people 
with good general education and technical skills has been invaluable.  Although not as remarkable as East 
Asia, educational development in Latin America has also been impressive.    
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But the future for developed countries is somewhat different.  The continuation of 
improvements in health and reductions in mortality into old age, and continuing 
reductions in fertility, coupled with the aging of the baby boom generation, are set to 
produce a new age structure with high levels of old age dependency.  How well these 
countries cope with the challenge of population aging will likely depend to a large extent 
on the flexibility of their markets and the appropriateness of their institutions and 
policies.  
 It is important to remember that the projected changes in age structure and falling 
population numbers expected in the developed countries are unparalleled in history. 
While we have extensive experience of high rates of youth dependency, and of high 
ratios of working age to total population, developed countries are set to experience high 
rates of old age dependency and rapidly declining population numbers for the first time. 
While we can make projections for this, it should be borne in mind that there is little 
previous evidence to serve as a guide.   
One view is that population aging in the developed countries is likely to have a 
large effect, reducing income per capita, mainly through the fall in labor supply per capita 
that will accompany the reduction in the share of working age population.   
  However, even if this occurs, it may not be as harmful as it at appears for three 
reasons.  First, income per capita is not a welfare measure.  Nordhaus (2003) estimates 
that over the 20
th century improvements in longevity made a contribution to increasing 
welfare in the United States of roughly the same magnitude as the rise in consumption 
levels.  The longer life expectancies that lead to aging can be thought of as improving 
welfare directly.  Even if rising life expectancy were to lead to reduced consumption 
levels per period, it is difficult to argue that the net effect of increased longevity on 
welfare will be negative.      
    Second, welfare depends on consumption, not income.  Typically household 
income falls at retirement, but consumption may remain relatively high.  It follows that 
we could have two populations, each enjoying the same consumption stream over the 
same lifespan, but the population with a larger elderly age cohort will have lower per 
capita income.  For example, the accounting identity given in Section III is compatible 
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with income per worker remaining constant while movements in income per capita are 
driven by the contemporaneous age structure.  However, this means that the wage rate 
and life cycle income and consumption of each person may remain unchanged while the 
income per capita at each point in time moves with age structure.  It follows that while 
we predict a reduction in income per capita as a result of population aging, to the extent 
that this is an accounting effect based on age structure at each point in time, it may not 
affect the welfare of each cohort. 
  Third, old age “dependency” is something of a misnomer.  Lee (2000) shows that, 
in all pre-industrial societies for which he was able to assemble evidence, the flow of 
transfers is from the middle-aged and old to the young.  In developed countries, on the 
other hand, both the young and the old benefit from government transfers, and the net 
pattern of transfers is towards the elderly.  However, at the household level in the United 
States, elderly households make significant transfers to middle-aged households, undoing 
to some extent the effects of government policy.  The dependency burden of the elderly is 
a function of the institutional welfare systems that are in place rather than an immutable 
state of affairs.  
    While the consequences of a fall in per capita income may not be all that bad for 
welfare, it is not even clear that population aging will lead to a fall in per capita income.  
Increases in life expectancy in the United States over the last two centuries have been 
associated with reductions in the age-specific incidence of disease, disability, and 
morbidity (Costa, 1998; Fogel, 1994, 1997).  Mathers and others (2001) show that health-
adjusted life expectancy (each life year weighted by a measure of health status) rises 
approximately one for one with life expectancy across countries.  This implies that the 
length of period of ill health at the end of life appears to be fairly constant and as life 
expectancy rises health status improves proportionately. 
  Given longer life spans, people can either work longer or consume less.  If they 
work longer they can keep their consumption levels high and need only save at the same 
rate as before for old age.  If they decide to take extra leisure and retire at the same age as 
before they will have lower consumption levels throughout their life and will need higher 
savings rates while working.  Bloom, Canning, and Moore (2004) examine this issue 
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theoretically and argue that when health improves and longevity rises, the optimal 
response is likely to be a longer worker life, without the need for higher savings.  The 
tendency towards early retirement is explained by an income effect with people wanting 
more leisure time as incomes rise.   
  To the extent that working lives lengthen in response to longer life spans there is 
no reduction in income levels.  Indeed average income and consumption per capita can 
remain high.  The fixed definition of the working age population (15-64 years of age) we 
used in our analysis in Section III (like our assumption of a fixed participation ratio for 
this group) assumes no behavioral change when in fact such changes may occur.  
  While projections based on fixed labor supply may suggest a labor shortage, this 
is exactly the situation in which market responses may be expected to ameliorate the 
situation.  Rising wages will tend to increase labor market participation, particularly of 
women and the younger elderly, and may also to some extent induce inward migration.  
If these supply responses are sufficiently elastic the required rise in wages may be small, 
implying the command of the elderly over labor resources out of their retirement income 
is not diminished significantly.   
  A greater challenge is to ensure that non-market institutions are capable of 
responding to the problems that arise with an aging population.  The two major issues are 
labor supply and saving.  In terms of labor supply, any institutional factors that prevent a 
supply response to rising wages need to be addressed.   
Of particular concern are social security systems that encourage early retirement 
and financially penalize a longer working life.  Gruber and Wise (1998) show that labor 
market participation of the elderly is quite responsive to social security incentives.   
Belgium, Italy, France, Germany, and the Netherlands have large incentives to retire 
early, with implicit tax rates (taking account of taxes and lost benefits) on earnings 
around age 65 in excess of 60%, and corresponding low participation rates of the 55 to 65 
age group.  On the other hand, the United States, Canada, Sweden, and in particular Japan 
have much lower effective tax rates on older workers and correspondingly higher labor 
force participation.  Ideally, tax revenues should be raised in the least distortionary 
manner possible.  In light of the evidence of a large labor supply response to high 
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effective tax rates on older workers, the policy environment seems to afford much scope 
for improvement (for example, by making social security systems in Europe actuarially 
neutral, so that workers who work for longer receive higher benefits when they do retire, 
based on their contributions and life expectancy at that point).  
       Labor shortages and rising wages due to population aging can also be alleviated 
by allowing greater immigration from less developed countries.  The large wage gaps that 
exist between countries and the fact that the demographic transitions in different regions 
are out of phase create an incentive for such migration.  
Figure 11 shows the number and age structure of migrants to the United States 
between 2000 and 2003.  The migrants are overwhelmingly of working age.  Figure 12 
shows the age structure of the United States population in 2003 and separates out the 
native and foreign born populations.  The age structure of the foreign born is 
concentrated in the working age group, though this is less pronounced than the age 
structure of recent migrants reflecting the aging of earlier migrants to the United States. 
In-migration has made a significant contribution to improving the ratio of workers to 
non-workers in the United States.  For example, in 2003, the US ratio of working age to 
non-working age population was 1.89; in the absence of inward migration (that is, 
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Over the next 50 years, population aging in Western Europe will be more rapid 
than in the United States, due to a lower birth rate and to lower levels of immigration.  It 
seems clear that the incentives to increase labor supply will become large in Western 
Europe, to provide workers to supply labor intensive services to the elderly, and to shore 
up to some extent the tax base for social security transfer systems.  While there may be 
resistance to longer working lives, or large-scale immigration, the economic incentives 
for one or both of these responses may grow very strong.  Hatton and Williamson (2001, 
2002) discuss the increasing pressures for migration from developing to developed 
countries that are likely to occur due to demographic change.  
  For both saving and labor supply, however, markets are not the main mechanisms 
that need to be addressed.  Rather, policy responses are required.  In the case of a longer 
working life, we have already discussed the negative incentives currently in place and 
argued for a more encouraging tax regime for older workers.  In the case of migration the 
policy issues are more complex.  It is clear that the large wage gaps between rich and 
poor countries mean that there are large potential gains to migration.  These gains largely 
accrue to the migrants themselves.  There are, however, negative externalities to the 
receiving country and possibly to the sending country.  Competition for jobs may depress 
wages, harming workers in the receiving country, while the loss of working age people 
and the human capital they embody (the “brain drain” effect) may depress income levels 
in the sending country.  A second issue with migration is its effect on national culture and 
public goods provision.  Alessina and Spolare (2004) make the point that societies that 
are heterogeneous in terms of ethnic, linguistic, and religious composition appear to be 
worse at providing efficient levels of public goods.  Levitt (2001) explores the concept of 
social remittances that coincide with international migration.    
  The challenge with migration is to devise institutions that turn a large potential 
efficiency gain into a Pareto improvement by compensating those who lose from the 
process.  Such a scheme would not only help improve welfare, but might also remove 
much of the political opposition to migration by ensuring that it is a win-win proposition. 
Similar issues occur with trade in commodities and lessons from that arena may well be 
applicable to migration.   
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      A second central issue in population aging involves the provision of income to the 
elderly.  The disequilibrium dynamics of the age structure mean that providing for the 
elderly through a transfer system based on rigid sets of tax rates on workers and benefit 
rates to retirees is not sustainable.  The support of large numbers of elderly will require 
real resources to be accumulated today to supply their needs in the future.   
  Social security transfer systems actually undermine this accumulation of 
resources by reducing the need for workers to save.  However, social security systems in 
some form appear to be essential.  There is a widespread lack of foresight about the need 
to save for retirement perhaps due to time inconsistency in preferences (Feldstein, 1985; 
Laibson, 1998; Laibson et al. 1998).  There may also be in some countries capital market 
imperfections (Hubbard and Judd, 1987) that may make saving for retirement 
unappealing.   
  There is general agreement among academics about the need for institutional 
changes in developing countries to move away from pay-as-you-go pension systems to at 
least partially funded systems.  There are however two difficulties with such policies.  
The first is that large-scale savings may lower the return on savings to the point where it 
becomes difficult for a large cohort to generate sufficient resources for retirement.  This 
is partly a case of a low return on investment.  As savings surge, investment opportunities 
become scarce, and there is a worsening in the inter-temporal terms of trade as the low 
wages of the large baby boom generation are replaced by the high wages of the 
succeeding small cohort.  However, Poterba (2004) argues that demographic factors 
appear to have had only a small effect on real rates of return historically.   
  A more worrying prospect than a fall in the long run rate of return may be a large 
and long lasting financial crisis that reduces the returns to a particular cohort.  The 
prospect of such a crisis creates aggregate uncertainty regarding the value of capital, 
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